Oberlin

Digital Commons at Oberlin
Faculty & Staff Scholarship
6-1-2011

Varieties Of Capitalism, Power Resources, And Historical
Legacies: Explaining The Slovenian Exception
Stephen Crowley
Oberlin College

Miroslav Stanojevic

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/faculty_schol
Part of the Political Science Commons

Repository Citation
Crowley, Stephen, and Miroslav Stanojevic. 2011. "Varieties Of Capitalism, Power Resources, And
Historical Legacies: Explaining The Slovenian Exception." Politics & Society 39(2): 268-295.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty & Staff Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For more
information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu.

PAS40544
0
PAS

Varieties of Capitalism,
Power Resources, and
Historical Legacies:
Explaining the
Slovenian Exception

Politics & Society
39(2) 268–295
© 2011 SAGE Publications
Reprints and permission: http://www.
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0032329211405440
http://pas.sagepub.com

Stephen Crowley1 and Miroslav Stanojević 2

Abstract
Although Slovenia is a small, relatively new nation-state, it has been justifiably called
“neocorporatist” and a “coordinated market economy,” making it unique among post
communist societies, including ten new EU member states. The authors explore how it
became so, and in the process shed light on the debate between varieties of capitalism
(VoC) and power resources theories about how coordinated or neocorporatist
economies emerge. Although several of the elements predicted by the varieties of
capitalism perspective were present in Slovenia, others were not. The authors also
find that a significant mobilization by organized labor at a crucial point played an
essential role, and overall find that power resources theory has greater explanatory
power in this case. However, in turning from explaining how the Slovenian model was
formed to why it was so unique among postcommunist cases, they find that specific
historical legacies were critical, particularly those from the distinct Yugoslav form of
communism.
Keywords
varieties of capitalism, power resources, labor, postcommunism, east central Europe
Although Slovenia is a small, relatively new nation-state, it arguably has something
considerable to tell us about the possibilities and limits of alternatives to economic
liberalism in the twenty-first century. By most accounts Slovenia is considered to be
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neocorporatist or, in the language of the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature, a
coordinated market economy, uniquely so among the many countries that have emerged
from communism in the last two decades. But how did it emerge as such? How were
coordination and corporatism created in Slovenia?
As some have argued, the transformation of communism into capitalism provides
social scientists with something of a natural experiment. Whereas most countries in
east central Europe adopted some version of neoliberalism, with varying degrees of
success, Slovenia is a fascinating case—in part because its policies ran counter to the
prescriptions of international financial institutions. In contrast to most—if not all—
other countries in east central Europe, Slovenia deliberately chose a gradualist approach
to capitalist transformation, with a relatively low level of foreign direct investment, a
slow pace of privatization, and the adoption of seemingly rigid labor relations and a
generous welfare regime. Moreover, Slovenia did so during a period, after the collapse
of communism, that may have represented the apogee of neoliberal ideology.
Yet Slovenia not only fares well compared to other postcommunist countries in terms
of labor and social standards, but also in terms of economic indicators; by most measures it is the most successful of the postcommunist economies. Its standard of living
and wages are the highest of the new member states, and already approach the levels
of some older EU members. Certainly this is a model to be emulated. Yet, if this is so,
it remains to be explained why no other countries have adopted it, or even attempted
to go down Slovenia’s path.
We will argue here that the Slovenian case can help reveal the strengths and limits
of VoC theory versus power resources theory as explanations for different paths of
capitalist development. Here we will focus in particular on two criticisms of the VoC
framework: whether VoC theory can account adequately for the emergence of distinct
types of capitalism, and whether the relative power of social actors, especially labor,
better explains outcomes than does the interests of firms and employers.1
More specifically, we will argue that we do find evidence to support the VoC account
of the emergence of coordinated institutions in Slovenia: out of all postcommunist
societies, Slovenia alone came out of communism with a dominant portion of its export
sector dependent on skilled labor, where employers had a strong interest in coordinated
institutions. This is a pretty strong correlation. Yet we also find that the logic of emp
loyers’ interests provides only a partial explanation—a necessary but not sufficient condition. At least as important, we argue, was a well-timed strike wave, which erupted
when the basic institutions of the Slovenian political economy were being shaped.
Without this wave of labor mobilization, and the continued relative strength of unions
in Slovenia, coordinated institutions would either not have emerged, or at the very
least would have been considerably weaker and less established than they have been,
lending strong support to the power resources theory. However, this leads us to a further question: why did Slovenia, uniquely out of ten postcommunist EU members, have
a labor movement sufficiently strong to create coordinated labor institutions? Here we
agree with Iversen and colleagues on the importance of specific historical legacies and
pathways in the formation of distinct political economies;2 however, we find only partial
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support for the factors they emphasize, and instead find very different and more recent
historical factors at work in this case.3 For Slovenia, the crucial factor is the specific
legacy of Yugoslav self-managed socialism, which differed substantially from the communist legacy in countries such as Poland. Thus, central elements of both VoC and
power resources theories were necessary to make Slovenia a coordinated economy,
but also crucial was the legacy of Yugoslav (as opposed to Soviet-dominated) socialism. Taken together, while the Slovenian case shows that alternative paths of development exist, it also demonstrates that its coordinated postcommunism was a highly
contingent outcome.
This article will proceed in four parts: first, a theoretical discussion of VoC and
power resources theories of the development of distinct forms of capitalism; second,
an examination of just how exceptional Slovenia is; third, an evaluation of the validity
of different explanatory approaches; and finally, an exploration of the theoretical imp
lications of empirical findings.

Varieties of Capitalism and
Power Resources Theories
Are there alternatives to liberalization given increasingly global economic competition?
Although ample reasons exist to be pessimistic about the viability of social democracy
and corporatism in the twenty-first century, the now extensive literature on the varieties of capitalism argues that alternatives exist and will likely persist. The VoC theoretical perspective makes two central claims: first, that even in a globalized era, there
are groups of national production regimes with distinctive institutional configurations—
or in short, distinct varieties of capitalism—and second, these varieties of capitalism are
largely resistant to pressures toward convergence.4
These claims have generated considerable discussion, and it is beyond the scope
of this article to fully recount what has become the largest debate in the field of comparative political economy. However, for present purposes we can confine ourselves
to the now somewhat conventional VoC classification of Hall and Soskice, namely
the two ideal types of liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market
economies (CMEs), since it is generally accepted that Slovenia appears to be quite
close to the coordinated type; the concern here is how to explain how that coordination
came about.5
For the purposes of this article, we will focus on the three of the five spheres in Hall
and Soskice’s classification that have a direct impact on labor: bargaining mechanisms
for wages and work conditions, vocational training, and employee relations generally.6
Within these three spheres, in LMEs one finds flexible or decentralized labor markets
with low levels of union density, enterprise-level bargaining with limited extension to
other workers, and little or poorly functioning mechanisms of social dialogue with limited employers’ coordination across firms. Education tends to focus on general skills
to complement fluid labor markets, and there is a high degree of managerial prerogative
with little to no codetermination in the workplace. Conversely, in CMEs, one typically
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finds high levels of union membership, highly articulated mechanisms of social dialogue with well-organized employers, resulting in collective agreements with a high
rate of coverage at the national or sectoral level. These elements are combined with
education and training systems that provide high industry-specific or firm-specific skills,
and worker participation or codetermination at the workplace.7
Yet how are these different varieties created? According to VoC theory,
The more employers are coordinated within strong organizations, and the more
trade unions are articulated—both horizontally across sectors and vertically
between levels of representation—the more likely it is that cross-class coalitions
will develop long-term horizons and invest in specific and cospecific assets. It
then becomes possible to produce collective goods (e.g., wage moderation, skills,
and training provision) and the complementarities that bind them together.8
Such efficient bargains, reached in crucial sectors, will then spread throughout the eco
nomy to become its comparative institutional advantage.9 This logic is closely related
to arguments about the development of the welfare state, which, contrary to earlier
approaches, emphasize the needs of employers above all in accounting for the specific
ways social services are provided in different countries.10 These two literatures have
been recently brought together by Iversen, who argues that workers won’t invest in
firm-specific skills unless their income is protected from the risk of losing their jobs;
hence, employers and employees in such strategic firms and sectors will seek social
insurance to make an investment in skills less risky.11
Is such emphasis on employers’ interests justified? As one critical review of the literature put it, according to the VoC perspective, “the emergence of labor-inclusive political economies does not require worker mobilization let alone class struggle, since
generous welfare states are (co)built by, and partly for, employers.”12 In arguing that
capital rather than labor has been central to the creation and continued viability of
distinct welfare states and production regimes, these new perspectives challenge the
emphasis in earlier accounts, commonly known as power resources theory, that emp
hasize the importance of working-class organization and mobilization in explaining
distinct paths of welfare state development.13 Moreover, the predecessor to the VoC
perspective for explaining differences between capitalisms was neocorporatist theory,
where corporatist societies, in contrast to pluralist (or liberal) systems, were characterized above all by encompassing labor organizations. Although, as in the VoC perspective, corporatism is based on class compromise, such institutions were not created by
firms seeking efficient solutions for collective action problems; instead, they were
built as means to contain the overt class conflict of an earlier period.14 While labor
peace coincided with strong corporatist systems in the postwar era, many argue that
corporatist institutions evolved historically as a response to high levels of labor unrest
in Scandinavia and elsewhere.15 Thus we have two alternative explanations for the
emergence of distinct types of capitalism: the efficiency needs of firms and employers
related to skills, and the degree of working-class mobilization at crucial periods.
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Recently Iversen and others have set out to create a synthesis between the power
resources and the VoC approaches to explaining the development of specific capitalist
varieties, particular types of welfare states, and different electoral systems.16 They do
so by investigating the historical foundations and developmental pathways of these
different regimes to provide a historical analysis of how coordinated institutions and
resulting equilibria emerge. Iversen and his colleagues argue that countries that, by 1900,
had strong guild traditions, employer coordination, widespread rural cooperatives, a
large skill-based export sector, and centralized and industrial unions (as opposed to
fragmented and craft unions) all developed proportional representation election systems,
which they believe are essential to the coordinated model of capitalism and redistributionist welfare states. As we shall see, Slovenia shared a number of these characteristics,
yet others were weak or missing. Moreover, these elements were as strong or stronger
in some other east central European countries, though they failed to develop coordinated
institutions.
Arguably, a close examination of the evolution of coordinated institutions is essential to resolving such questions. Slovenia provides a unique example of a contemporary,
and rather rapid, development of a coordinated market. Others have looked at Slovenia
for precisely this reason.17 Indeed, while the VoC framework was originally developed
for advanced capitalist societies, a number of recent studies have applied the framework to the postcommunist region, some more critically than others.18 Some studies
have concluded that Slovenia fits the ideal type of a CME rather closely (while contrasting it with Estonia as a prototypical LME).19 Is Slovenia truly a coordinated market and neocorporatist society? If so, how did it become one?

Slovenia’s Postcommunist Neocorporatism
One might be tempted to dismiss Slovenia as a relatively small country with little additional significance. Yet the differences between it and the other postcommunist countries
are striking. Regarding unions, Slovenia’s level of union density was about 40 percent
through the 1990s, and although it has recently dropped below 30 percent, it is still
significantly higher than that of other postcommunist EU members where the average
density is 18.6 percent. Slovenia’s union density approaches the average density of the
preaccession EU member states (EU-15), which is 36.8 percent.20 Collective bargaining coverage—and the level on which those agreements are reached—is even more
central than union density to the distinction between coordinated and liberal capitalisms. Here Slovenia is more exceptional still in terms of its coverage rate for collective
agreements, which is said to be close to 100 percent, due to its extension rules. The
comparable coverage rate for other postcommunist new member states is 27.4 percent,
whereas the average coverage rate for the EU-15 is 78.8 percent.21
The level on which collective bargaining takes place is essential to the quality of
collective bargaining, as well as to the definitions of CMEs and neocorporatism. In
Slovenia, collective bargaining takes place predominantly at the sectoral level, framed
by income policy agreements; almost all bargaining elsewhere in Eastern Europe takes
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place at the company level.22 According to Visser’s centralization of wage bargaining
index, which measures the degree of centralization in bargaining on a scale from 1
(fully centralized) to 0 (no centralization), Slovenia’s degree of bargaining centra
lization is .43, close to the EU-15 average of .46, whereas the other new member states
average .26.23
The VoC literature argues that employer organizations are central to the creation
and continued viability of coordinated market economies. Yet, in postcommunist societies the lack of strong employer organizations has been, in the words of one study,
“the most significant weakness in industrial relations since the beginning of the transition.”24 Once again, Slovenia stands out. Until recently, the coverage rate of employer
organization in Slovenia approached 100 percent, due to compulsory membership in
the Chamber of Commerce. Since the law on compulsory membership was rescinded,
Slovenia’s rate of employer organization is said to be 40 percent; along with Hungary
its rate is the highest of the new member states, though lower than the EU-15 average
of 66.6 percent. In other postcommunist member states the employer organization rate
averages 27.4 percent.25
The VoC literature argues that employers’ organizations are central to coordinated
economies because of the need to prevent the poaching by other firms of workers who
have acquired industry-specific skills. With the collapse of communism, vocational
education has largely deteriorated in east central Europe, and these societies have generally moved toward more general skills training as in the liberal model.26 Slovenia is
exceptional in that it has a “dual system of apprenticeships, very much like the German
system.”27 Even more important has been the development of company-specific skills,
which is typical in the large and most advanced Slovenian firms. This is consistent
with VoC theory arguments about the generation of cospecific assets in CMEs.
Workplace participation is another characteristic of the coordinated model, according
to VoC theory. Slovenia is also unique in the postcommunist world for adopting works
councils that approach German-style codetermination.28 In Slovenia, as in Germany,
unions see works councils as an additional avenue for worker input, whereas elsewhere
in the region trade unions have viewed works councils as a means for employers to
undermine unions.29
Beyond centralized collective bargaining, Slovenia remains universally recognized
as the one country in the region with a fully functioning system of social dialogue, des
erving of the label “neocorporatist.”30 Additional evidence that Slovenia is unique
regarding social dialogue comes from the country’s experience with social pacts. In
order to meet the exacting macroeconomic Eurozone criteria, a number of countries in
Western Europe reached social pacts between unions and employers, compromising
on difficult issues such as wage moderation and government budget cuts.31 Despite the
fact that preparations for joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) pose significant
challenges for new member states—especially in terms of labor and welfare policies—
such pacts have been all but absent in east central Europe.32 The striking counterexample is once again Slovenia, which produced a series of income policy agreements
and social pacts beginning in the mid-1990s that focused on the incremental adoption
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Table 1. Industrial Relations in East Central Europe (ECE)
CZ
Union density
Collective bargaining
coverage
Collective bargaining
centralization
Employers’ density
Workplace
representation
Social pacts
Social expenditure
Pension reform

22
35

EE
14
22

.27

.25

HU
17
42

LV
16
20

.26

LT
14
15

.30

PL
17
35

.23

SK
30
50

.20

.33

32
44

25
25

40
36

25
27

20
23

20
22

30
50

—
18.7
No

—
12.4
Yes

—
22.3
Yes

—
12.4
Yes

—
13.1
Yes

—
19.2
Yes

—
16.7
Yes

SL

EU-ECE
(minus SL)

EU-15
avg.

>30
100

18.6
27.4

36.8
78.8

.43
40
64
Yes
23
No

.26

.46

27.4
32.4

66.6
59.6

None
16.4
8 of 9

Several
26.8
2 of 15

Sources: rows 1–2, 4–5: Euround European Industrial Relations Observatory on-line, http://www.eurofound.europa.
eu/eiro/country_index.htm; row 3: Jelle Visser, “Patterns and Variations in European Industrial Relations,” in Industrial
Relations in Europe 2004 (Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities); row 7:
Eurostat, Total expenditure on social protection, current prices (% of GDP), 2006 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/; row 8: Mitchell A. Orenstein, Privatizing Pensions: The Transnational Campaign for Social
Security Reform (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). CZ - Czech Repubic; EE - Estonia; HU - Hungary; LV Latvia; LT - Lithuania; PL - Poland; SK - Slovakia; SL - Slovenia; EU -15 - EU members before 2004 expansion

of the Eurozone criteria.33 Slovenia subsequently joined the Eurozone in 2007, the first
postcommunist member to do so.
Social dialogue mechanisms, when functioning, can directly influence the size and
shape of welfare states, and the VoC perspective argues that a coordinated economy
should have a more universal and egalitarian welfare state.34 Slovenia spends 23 percent
of its gross domestic product on social expenditures, below the EU-15 average of 26.8
percent, but well above the other eastern central European average of 16.4 percent.35
Still, a number of commentators have argued that welfare states in the Visegrád states
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) are relatively robust, and the
differences in welfare states between these four countries and Slovenia are not as great
as they are regarding labor policies.36 However, a number of new member states have
liberalized their welfare states, whereas Slovenia has largely refrained from doing so.
For example, virtually all Eastern European states have adopted some type of “new
pension reforms,” which entail the full or partial replacement of public social security
systems with systems based on private, individual pension savings accounts.37 Such a
policy was proposed for Slovenia, but was rejected, in no small part due to union mobilization against it.38
Table 1 summarizes a number of the statistical measures discussed in this section.
As the table indicates, Slovenia is the highest among east central European countries
in almost every category, and in most categories it approaches or surpasses the EU-15
average.
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Explaining Slovenia’s Neocorporatism
There is little question that Slovenia is truly exceptional among the many countries
emerging from communism, including those countries that are now EU member states.
The very existence of Slovenia as a CME lends credence to the claim of VoC theory
that coordinated economies remain viable.
But why is Slovenia so different from other postcommunist states? Others have
argued that the emergence of coordination in Slovenia is best explained through VoC
theory.39 We will argue that the picture is more complex.
Certainly a number of factors have led to Slovenia’s relative success. Slovenia was
a republic within Yugoslavia, and this had several consequences. Yugoslavia was the
most market-oriented of countries within communist Eastern Europe, and since it was
outside the Soviet bloc, it had extensive trade relations with the capitalist world.
Slovenia was also the most “western” of the Yugoslav republics, in terms of geography,
market orientation, trade profile, and standard of living.40 Also in significant contrast
to other Yugoslav republics, Slovenia was the most ethnically homogenous, and as the
first republic to secede from the Yugoslav federation, it was able to achieve independence in days, with a minimal amount of bloodshed.41
Thus upon independence, Slovenia was a largely market-oriented economy already,
with a higher standard of living than any other former communist country. Moreover,
the initial recession was not as severe as elsewhere and “throughout the transition period
Slovenia sustained favorable positions in its fiscal and external accounts.”42 As such,
it was less susceptible to pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
partly as a result, the nation was able to pursue a gradualist approach to economic transformation.43 Accordingly, it has relied on much lower levels of foreign direct investment than most other countries in east central Europe, most of whom made the attraction
of foreign capital a cornerstone of their policies.
Although much of this helps explain why Slovenia has been relatively successful,
how do we explain the rapid development of coordinated institutions in particular?
Feldmann, following Hall and Soskice, proposes a “theory of emerging VoC coordination,” which emphasizes the role of networks or ties among actors that can help solve
collective action problems. In the Slovenian case, he points to two important policy
choices that helped transform proto-networks into institutions that promoted cooperation. First, many different forms of privatization were debated, but the ruling party of
the time had “close ties to the old economic elites, including enterprise directors.”
Largely for this reason, the government chose a privatization strategy that privileged
insiders, “which essentially cemented the preexisting networks by strengthening the
role of insiders as owners.”44 The second policy innovation was centralized collective
bargaining, which Feldmann argues came about in part because membership in
the employers’ organization, the Chamber of Commerce, was mandatory. Yet this
is insufficient to explain why employers would choose centralized bargaining. In addition, Feldmann argues that Slovenia chose a managed float for its currency, which led
to wage increases:
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Real wage increases became unsustainable in the early 1990s, and this was a
source of major concern to employers (especially exporters) and the government.
The establishment of [tripartism] in 1994 followed a year of very high wage
increases—11.6 percent in 1993—and the centralization of wage bargaining
was seen as a key step to combat this problem.45
Even though inflationary wage pressures certainly spurred employers to support centralized wage bargaining, the managed float was not the primary source of that wage
pressure, as we shall see.
Perhaps more important for the VoC perspective was that the Slovenian economy
centered around a core group of large capital-intensive and western-oriented companies
from the metal and machine industry (such as Gorenje) and chemical/pharmaceutical
industries (such as Krka), where workers cooperated with managers in a form of
Streeck’s “competitive solidarity.”46 In these companies, employers supported the job
security of core workers in order to motivate them to develop company-specific skills.
In this way, managers and workers in these sectors developed cross-class coalitions, and
the coalitions within these dominant firms had a strong influence on the laws that became
the core of the Slovenian coordinated model.47 Adding all of this up, the Slovenian case
appears to confirm much of the institutional logic of coordinated economies.
However, important elements are missing from this account. For one, the westernoriented companies in Slovenia represented a departure from coordinated firms elsewhere in that the protected Yugoslav market effectively subsidized them during the
communist period. As Jaklič et al. explain,
The peculiarity concerning the functioning of these companies was the lack of
hard budget constraints, a feature that was all-encompassing and the result of lax
monetary policy used as the ultimate risk-sharing tool since it prevented companies from going bankrupt. As a consequence, the Yugoslav dinar was not convertible and the country was chronically in need of foreign exchange. Companies
were therefore stimulated to export and generate hard currency inflows even if
that meant selling abroad at loss. That eventual loss could be compensated for
by selling at profit in the well-protected home market.48
Thus with Slovenian independence, the hardening of budget constraints combined with
the loss of the protected Yugoslav markets meant these firms faced a rather unique crisis
of competitiveness.
Moreover, in addition to this dominant capital-intensive part of the export sector, a
massive number of labor-intensive companies from the textile, footwear, and wood industries had been almost exclusively focused on the vanishing Yugoslav market. This part
of industry, which based its price competition on cheap, unskilled labor, was an important source of trade union membership (where, in addition to high density rates overall,
industrial workers made up about 70 percent of union membership through the mid1990s) and mobilization power. The left-center government that ruled with considerable
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stability for twelve years was very much influenced by the interplay of these capitaland labor-intensive sectors, and government policies—such as privatization and monetary policy—were aimed at the common denominator that would benefit both groups.
Thus, in contrast to a primary focus on the interest of employers for efficiency gains
as in the VoC account, we develop an alternative approach that emphasizes two sets of
factors: the extent to which labor and class conflict (rather than employers and cooperation) helped shape institutional outcomes, and the historical conditions that might
enable labor to mobilize sufficiently to do so. In the case of Slovenia, a more historical
approach would emphasize that the Yugoslav experience with communism was quite
different from that of other states in the region. Unlike other Eastern European countries (except for Albania), communist rule came about in Yugoslavia through an indigenous revolution, rather than being imposed by Soviet tanks. This basic fact—whether
communism was viewed as homegrown or alien—has had an enormous impact on
how communist-era institutions were viewed in the postcommunist era.
Moreover, Yugoslav communism was forced to develop outside of the Soviet bloc,
and as a result, sought to legitimize its independence through the ideology and institutions of “self-management,” which had significant consequences for labor in particular.
Most concretely for our purposes, unlike other communist states, the Yugoslav regime
tolerated strikes and sought to dampen them by quickly meeting workers’ demands, a
policy that often had the unintended effect of encouraging others to strike.49 Like unions
in other communist countries, Yugoslav unions were set up as “transmission belts” of
Communist Party rule, but the pressure from strikes—as well as competition from
legally protected workers councils operating as parallel structures to unions—gradually
pushed unions to become more responsive to worker demands.
By the late 1980s, as the country underwent economic crisis and hyperinflation,
Yugoslavia was faced with a massive strike wave.50 As Slovenia achieved independence in June 1991, the strike wave continued, and in effect “connected the country’s
‘communist’ and ‘postcommunist’ periods.”51 Indeed, the relationship between the
newly emerging Slovenian state and trade unions “started in a confrontational manner.”52
Upon independence, and in a fragile social and economic context marked by high inflation (approaching 200 percent per year), the government froze wages and suspended
collective agreements and unilaterally issued a draft agreement on social stability.
This action infuriated Slovenia’s unions; in response, on March 18, 1992, the main
union federation Zveza svobodnih sindikatov Slovenije (ZSSS) organized a massive
warning strike that involved work stoppages, blockades, and a power cut that paralyzed the country for a few hours.53
The warning strike triggered the strike wave in 1992, when, despite the country’s
small size, there were approximately 200 strikes in that year alone.54 The strike wave
took on “the characteristics of a spontaneous mass workers’ movement,” meaning that
“Slovenia was faced with the possibility of an explosion of social unrest.”55 Strikes
began to taper off in the years after, and by the end of 1990s, strikes in Slovenia were
rare. We need to use caution in interpreting Slovenian strike data, since they come from
the main trade union federation.56 However, according to these figures, during the crucial
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Figure 1. Changes in strike volume by region and year

Sources: Laborsta Internet, http://laborsta.ilo.org/; Miroslav Stanojević, “Formation of the Slovenian
Pattern: The Strike Wave and Industrial Relations ‘Rigidities,’” South-East Europe Review 6, no. 3 (2003):
17–30.

years of 1992 to 2000, Slovenia was the most strike-prone country in east central Europe:
the volume of strikes (or working days lost per 1,000 employees) in those years was
ninety-two in Slovenia, compared to twenty-one elsewhere in Eastern Europe. This is
rather surprising when one considers that Slovenia has the strongest corporatist institutions in the region, and is often characterized as a society with considerable labor peace,
though this characterization fits only from the mid-1990s onward.
According to power resources theory, the explanation for the establishment of strong
corporatist institutions has been the mobilization power of workers. Despite the dramatic transformations in the region, strike rates have been significantly lower on average in Eastern Europe (excluding Slovenia) than in Western Europe from the 1990s to
the present (see Figure 1).57
However, when we disaggregate the data we find significant strike activity in four
countries in the region (see Figure 2).58 We need to be cautious in making comparisons, given differences in counting rules. The Polish strike rates, for instance, seem
particularly undercounted.59 But based on the available data, the Slovenian strike wave
stands out for its multiyear intensity, for its cross-sectoral composition (matched only
by Poland), and most crucially we will argue, for having peaked in 1992, so early in the
transition period.
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What were the consequences of the Slovenian strike wave, and what might explain
why strikes began to decline after 1992? The immediate impact of the “warning strike”
of March 1992 was that wages were unfrozen, and a month later the center-right Demos
government led by Christian Democrat Prime Minister Alojz Peterle resigned and a
caretaker government was formed.60 The interim prime minister was Janez Drnovšek,
president of the center-left Liberal Democrats of Slovenia (LDS) party. The interim
government adopted a law on privatization (the Law on Ownership) and at the end the
year, Drnovšek’s LDS party won reelection to lead a revised coalition, and from there
led a succession of center-left coalition governments for the next twelve years.61
Most importantly, the basic institutions of Slovenia’s postcommunist political eco
nomy were forged during—and often in direct response to—this period of intense labor
conflict. Significantly, the strikes were often led not by workers in the leading, westernoriented and highly skilled sector emphasized by VoC theory, but more often by workers in less-skilled and labor-intensive industries, which were hit hard by the loss of the
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then-vanishing Yugoslav market.62 Moreover, the immediate demands were often defensive in nature, protesting low wages or their late payment. Yet crucially, the strike wave
coincided with debates over the form of privatization for the Slovenian economy. As
Feldmann notes, a number of different proposals regarding privatization were on the table
at this time.63 However, despite Feldmann’s claim, the former communists, the party
with the closest ties to enterprise directors, were not the ruling party when the Law on
Ownership was passed in 1992; the LDS was. On the other hand, the Law on Ownership
coincided rather closely with the dissatisfaction expressed by striking workers in the
labor-intensive industries that had fully depended on the Yugoslav market. Given
these pressures, as well as the Yugoslav legacy of social ownership (or self-management),
all participants in the debate over the new law on privatization implicitly agreed that
workers should get some shares. The major trade union ZSSS organized a special
conference in October of 1992, where it formulated demands for workers to be given
the majority of shares and then delivered those demands to Parliament.64 The version
of the law finally adopted was a compromise, but one that strongly favored internal
buyouts that benefited all the key players: the state, managers, and workers.65 Workers
did get majority shares in many firms, but primarily in the labor-intensive (and strikeprone) sectors.66 After this initial protopolitical exchange, strikes in these industries
quieted down; this exchange signaled that unions were a force to be reckoned with, but
also that they could be included in the policy-making process as responsible, corporatist,
social partners.67
Through this initial step labor’s voice first became institutionalized.68 As has been
argued elsewhere,
The discontent expressed through the strikes was extremely intense, so the price
of its lowering was high. The Slovenian political elite, under the pressure of massive social discontent, had to promote striking workers into being (co-)owners
of the factories. This was the direct price for “calming down” the tensions.69
Although the privatization law helped dampen strike activity, it did not solve the problem of wage inflation and the challenge of competitiveness, which continued at high
levels even after the election of Drnovšek’s revised center-left coalition. From the viewpoint of employers, including those in western-oriented firms, there were initially a
number of levers that might be used to reduce wage demands and boost competiveness.
The simplest was to let the hardening of budget constraints and the resulting unemployment lower the market bargaining power of employees. Indeed, unemployment, which
had been quite low in Slovenia through much of the communist period, began to rise
significantly.70 However, due to mass strikes, employers soon abandoned this option
in order to end the strike wave, and backed the government’s introduction of early
retirement schemes and generous compensation for lost jobs as means to stabilize the
labor force. A second option was the wage freeze, proposed by the center-right Demos
coalition that had the support of a number of employers. But the March 1992 general
strike, called in response to the government’s unilateral wage freeze, sent a strong signal
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to all future governments that the issue of inflation could not be resolved without the
prior approval of the trade unions. If, given union opposition, a simple wage freeze
was out of the question, so was a monetarist solution, which would have entailed high
levels of unemployment, likely also triggering union opposition. Thus, even before the
center-right government was removed from power, the general strike “and several other
strikes convinced the government to abandon the wage freeze and to accept union
proposals to manage inflation via centralized collective bargaining.”71 Hence the government, together with unions and employers, pursued a policy of negotiated wage
constraint, with the first social pact in 1994 not only setting the parameters for incomes
policy for that year, but also establishing the Economic and Social Council, which
institutionalized the process of social dialogue. This was a straightforward political
trade-off: in exchange for supporting wage restraint, unions were given an institutional
forum that enabled their systematic participation in future policy formation.72 This
council of social dialogue subsequently allowed for the consensual formation of income
and other policies and stabilized Slovenia’s centralized collective bargaining system;
in fact, by lowering inflation, it stabilized the entire economy in addition to supporting
its relatively generous welfare regime. As VoC theory would contend, employers also
backed centralized collective bargaining, which offered a competitive price policy for
their firms (as did the government, since it provided the potential for national competitiveness and stabilization for future European integration). However, in the Slovenian
case, employers’ support clearly came in the context of wage inflation and a large strike
wave, where such external bargaining served to push the conflict-ridden issue of pay
outside of the firm. Thus, as Korpi has argued was the case elsewhere, employers did come
to embrace centralized bargaining, but only as a second (or third) best option, when
other avenues were closed.73
What occurred was chain of social conflicts, followed by political exchanges, and
finally the institutionalization of those exchanges. From the onset of independence and
in a challenging economic environment, a strike wave arose, marked by the impressive
general warning strike, which prevented the freezing of wages. After the general strike
the center-right government was replaced with an interim center-left government, which
coordinated work on the law on privatization favoring employee ownership, which
dampened the strike wave. After the adoption of the privatization law, LDS won the
election, and then—still being pressed by inflation—invited unions to support a policy
of wage restraint. Unions accepted this offer in exchange for political influence on the
shaping of future social and economic policy. The exchange was then institutionalized
in the spring of 1994 with the formation of the Economic and Social Council. This ins
titutionalization of corporatist mechanisms helped the center-left remain in power in
Slovenia for twelve years.
To be sure, a number of crucial factors helped create the coordinated model for
Slovenia, not least its relatively favorable starting conditions, including the westernoriented and skilled export sector whose interests, as the VoC approach would predict,
came to dominate the political economy. Yet other factors were equally important and
have been overlooked. In particular, labor mobilization played a substantial role in the
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formation of Slovenia’s coordinated economy. Of the two factors that Feldmann argues
were central to “network promotion” in the creation of Slovenia’s CME (insider privatization and centralized bargaining), both were directly impacted by the strike wave
(the latter directly through worker demands and indirectly through wage growth pressure that gave employers the incentive to support coordinated wage bargaining).
Of course, strikes by themselves won’t bring about coordination. As a brief comparison with Poland will make clear, the timing of the strikes was also crucial, along
with the fact that they were led by a united union movement, and that they centered
around broadly social democratic demands.

Strikes without Coordination in Poland
Why was Slovenia the only postcommunist country with a labor movement powerful
enough to push successfully for coordinated labor institutions? For reasons of space,
we will focus on a comparison with Poland, which justifiably stands out in the region
(and the world) for its historically strong labor movement, one that played a central
role in bringing an end to communist rule in Poland. While Romania and Hungary also
experienced high strike rates in certain years (Figure 2), those actions were largely confined to certain industries.74 The comparison is imperfect: there are substantial differences in population size, starting conditions, and such factors as the relative proportion
of the rural sector.75 Still, aside from Slovenia, Poland was the only country to experience a sustained, multiyear strike wave across industries; and like Slovenia, it did so
relatively early in the postcommunist period.76 If any labor movement in east central
Europe had sufficient power resources to push for the institutionalization of workers’
interests it was Poland.
As Ekiert and Kubik note in their study, “During the 1989–1993 period, collective
protest in Poland was intense” and “waves of strikes swept through entire sectors of
the economy.”77 In both Poland and Slovenia, the first years of the postcommunist
period were met with significant labor protests. Yet the impact of the protests and the
policy outcomes they helped shape were quite different in both cases.
Although communist legacies were essential in shaping the labor movements in
both countries, those legacies were quite different in each case. Unlike Yugoslavia,
where communism came about through indigenous revolution, communism in Poland
was largely imposed by the Red Army after World War II. With the end of communism, Solidarity’s struggle against the communist-backed trade unions led to a highly
fragmented union movement, divided primarily by the stark ideological divisions between
the two leading union federations, Solidarity and the (once communist-backed) OPZZ.
While a number of scholars have argued that union competition spurs labor mobilization, partisan ties also shape union strategies, and labor mobilization in Poland was
muted by the political alliances of the opposing unions.78 Thus the first postcommunist
government in Poland was led by Solidarity, the party directly allied with the union
movement, though in 1989 it began implementing the economic policy that became
known as “shock therapy.” Paczynska argues that while Polish unions were later
relatively influential,
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In the first years of reform both trade unions and work councils did little to block
the restructuring of enterprises and in many cases were active promoters of these
changes. At the national level, Solidarity trade union extended a “protective
umbrella” over the reforms, containing strike activities and promoting enterprise
restructuring.79
In one clear contrast with Slovenia, where the government’s proposed unilateral wage
freeze was met with a general strike led by ZSSS, when Poland’s Solidarity government imposed a controversial tax on wage hikes, the Solidarity union acted to tamp
down any strike action.80 Only when the Solidarity union’s support for reforms began
depleting its membership rolls and prompting wildcat strikes did the union begin to
oppose economic reforms. Yet when the Solidarity government lost the election in
1993 and was replaced by the ex-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left, allied
with OPZZ, the Solidarity union, shaped more by anticommunism than traditional
working-class goals, opposed even pro-labor legislation backed by the new government.81 Thus in contrast to Slovenia, unions in Poland were not only divided, but
Solidarity, the dominant Polish union, often refused to back social democratic goals at
crucial periods of reform.82
Not surprisingly, these divisions and strategies had a direct impact on how labor
power was translated into policy. First, Poland and Slovenia were both unique in having large strike waves early in the transition period, but the exact timing was different
in each case. Partly because the Solidarity union provided a “protective umbrella” for
reforms, when shock therapy reforms began in 1989–90, labor protests rose significantly
only in 1991 and reached a peak in 1992.83 Although strikes in Slovenia also peaked
in 1992, Slovenia achieved independence in mid-1991, and the Slovenian strike wave
was built on a wave of strikes that had begun in the Yugoslav period prior to independence.84 Thus, Polish reformers had a two-year opening before strikes reached their
peak (which leading reformer Leszek Balcerowicz later referred to as Poland’s “window of opportunity”),85 whereas Slovenian strikes spilled over from the communist
period, before most major reforms had begun. In short, whereas the Polish strikes were
reactive, strikes in Slovenia were constitutive.
Second, and partly as a result, while Polish officials made significant concessions
to end the strike wave, the main impact of those concessions was to slow the pace of
reform, rather than to fundamentally alter or reshape it. The wage restraint policy was
dropped, enterprise restructuring was slowed, and unemployment levels were relatively
constrained for a time.86 Privatization proceeded at a much slower pace in Poland than
in neighboring countries, with some concessions to employee ownership.87 Even
though unions had success in modifying certain policies, as Ekiert and Kubik conclude,
“the main contours of economic policy introduced in 1990 were neither challenged or
drastically changed.”88 In Poland, labor’s power resources, when measured by mobilization capacity, appeared quite significant, but the key question was how that power
was organized and how labor’s interests and goals were interpreted.
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Although there are limits to what we can conclude from this brief comparison, we
argue that if Poland had a single union confederation, united around a clear goal of
social democratic principles, pushed by a similar strike wave occurring earlier in the
transition period (i.e., had Polish unions been more like Slovenian unions), the outcome would have been a substantially different, and a much less “liberal,” if not coordinated, economy.89 This would of course have required Polish society to be fundamentally
different from the one that emerged from communism.
Although we have argued that the Yugoslav legacy was different, other post-Yugoslav
countries faced nationalist wars that, in contrast to Slovenia, diverted labor’s attention
at a crucial moment—during the founding of independent states. Still, labor protests
in Serbia continued during wartime, and worker mobilization played a key part in the
downfall of Slobodan Milošević.90 More recently, in Serbia and Croatia, workers have
taken the dramatic steps of factory occupations as a means of protesting what are considered illegitimate privatizations.91 Though these protests typically take place without
union backing, unionization rates in Serbia and Croatia are in the range of 40 percent,
making them, along with Slovenia, the most unionized Eastern European states.92
However, in the case of Slovenia, the coordinated model has recently come under
considerable pressure. In 2006, the center-right government, which had come to power
in 2004 when Slovenia joined the EU, deliberately attempted to dismantle the networks
of coordination described by Feldmann.93 The government changed the law that gover
ned membership in the main Chamber of Commerce that represented large companies—
shifting membership from obligatory to voluntary (although it did not apply the same
reform to the chamber that represented small companies). The employers in large, exportoriented firms were willing to acquiesce to these changes for one crucial reason: the
government signaled that is would soon sell its remaining shares in these firms, and
managers were willing to sacrifice coordinated institutions in order to gain greater personal ownership of their firms. As a result, employers have become divided.
Once again, labor mobilized in response, so far successfully, to resist “employer
demands to negotiate pay at company level only” and what some characterize as the
“rather radical demands of employers to reduce workers’ rights.”94 Employers also
lobbied for amendments to the Law on Labor Relations, which passed with strong support of the unions in 2002, in order to make it more flexible.95 Yet unions successfully
mobilized against the flexibilization of labor relations, and also succeeded in defeating
a proposed flat tax. Their pressure led to significant decline in public support for the
government, leading to the resignation of the minister for reforms, and later the
removal of the labor minister. Unions also succeeded in defeating a proposed flat tax.
Such protests, as well as the willingness of key employers to abandon coordination,
strongly suggest that coordination in Slovenia now rests more on the continued mobilization capacity of labor than on a functional equilibrium based on a cross-class coalition led by employers in leading firms.
However, recent developments have posed the question of whether Slovenia’s institutions of coordination and corporatism are resilient enough to survive the challenges
of a right-of-center government (defeated in elections of 2008), the resistance of
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employers, and the pressures of Eurozone membership. While Slovenia was better
positioned than many other postcommunist countries to weather the recent global economic crisis, as the recent decline in union density suggests, it remains to be seen if the
new center-left coalition will succeed in preventing further erosion of Slovenia’s institutions of coordination.

Theoretical Implications
There are limits to the conclusions that can be drawn from a single case. However, we
argue that the Slovenian example can help evaluate the strengths and limits of VoC
versus power resources theories in explaining the development of distinct political
economies. Although both theoretical approaches contribute to the answer of how
Slovenia created a coordinated economy, we find the power resources view more
persuasive in this case. Yet when we turn to the question of why coordination emerged
in Slovenia alone, out of ten postcommunist EU members, we turn to the importance
of historical legacies, pathways, and critical junctures.
First, we find VoC theory to be a necessary but insufficient explanation for the rise
of coordinated institutions in Slovenia. We argue that it is necessary based on a very
strong correlation: out of ten postcommunist members of the EU, Slovenia alone deve
loped coordinated institutions, and it alone emerged from communism with the economic
profile expected by VoC theory to generate sufficient support for coordination—namely
a dominant export-led sector of the economy that relied on skilled labor. Other studies
have also found Slovenia to adhere closely to the coordinated model of capitalism.96
At the very least—and this is one of the main points of the VoC argument—the example of Slovenia suggests there is indeed an alternative to an international competitiveness
strategy based on flexible labor markets and relatively low wages and labor standards
as a means of attracting foreign capital, even for countries emerging from forty-five
years of communism.
However, we also find the VoC account to be insufficient. Most especially, we find
that labor militancy played a central role in shaping Slovenia’s coordinated institutions, lending support to the argument that the power resources of social actors best
explains the rise of corporatism and generous welfare states, and that employers seek
compromise when confronted with class conflict.97 Slovenian employers, especially in
the crucial export sector, were certainly concerned with retaining skilled employees,
but the key institutions of Slovenian coordination and corporatism were created in the
wake of a massive strike wave, one that gave employers significant incentive to coordinate wage increases and forge other institutions, such as employee ownership, that
could contain future labor mobilizations. In short, although there is much in the
Slovenian case to support the VoC account, the evidence strongly suggests that labor
mobilization—in both its extent and its timing—was essential to the emergence of
coordination in Slovenia.98
In another crucial departure from VoC theory, not only did an undertheorized social
actor, namely labor, have a central impact, so did an unexpected sector. The strike wave
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was centered not in the skilled export sector, but in the less-skilled, labor-intensive sector, which quickly felt the pain of the transition to the (post-Yugoslav) market. Thus it was
this constellation of interests—labor and employer, unskilled and skilled sectors—that
had to be conciliated during the formation of the Slovenian political economy.
A single case study does not allow us to precisely weigh the importance of different
causal factors. However, subsequent events strongly suggest the importance of the
factors emphasized by power resources theory relative to those of VoC theory. Most
importantly, in recent years when employers were no longer compelled by law to organize themselves, many—especially in the skilled export sector—withdrew their membership in the employers’ Chamber of Commerce and began to push for the end of coordinated
institutions such as centralized collective bargaining. Thus in Slovenia we find little
evidence of the lock-in effects or stable equilibrium of coordinated institutions predicted by VoC theory. On the other hand, labor mobilized, and prevented some (but
not all) of these more liberal reforms from taking place. In short, if employer interests
were the main factor driving coordination, we would not expect significant numbers
of employers to defect once coordination was made voluntary rather than compulsory;
likewise, if labor’s power resources were insufficient, we would expect those coordinated institutions to have eroded fairly rapidly, and Slovenia to look much more like
other postcommunist societies.
Although we find strong support for the power resources perspective in explaining
how Slovenia created coordination, this begs the question of why only in Slovenia
did labor have sufficient power resources to achieve this outcome. Here we find that a
historical institutional explanation is crucial. Interestingly, Iversen and colleagues have
recently proposed a synthesis of power resources and VoC theories, and their explanation centers on deep historical paths of development to explain the divergence of coordinated and liberal market economies (and different electoral systems).99 As stated
earlier, according to their argument, countries that by 1900 had strong guild traditions,
employer coordination, widespread rural cooperatives, a large skill-based export sector, and centralized and industrial unions (as opposed to fragmented and craft unions)
all developed proportional representation election systems, which they say were essential for the creation of the coordinated model of capitalism and redistributionist welfare states.
Although Iversen and his collaborators rightly point to the importance of historical
pathways, the specific historical factors they identify are of only partial utility in east
central Europe. In the case of Slovenia, some of their historical preconditions were present, but others were not. On the one hand, the employers’ organization, the Chamber of
Commerce, was formed during the Habsburg Empire, and managed to survive the
socialist period. Rural, premodern cooperative communities were an important influence
on subsequent developments.100 On the other hand, Slovenia was not very industrialized by 1900 (the period Cusack et al. posit as crucial), with an even greater portion of
its population employed in agriculture than the average for the Austro-Hungarian
empire, where industrialization remained relatively low and very uneven. Nor was there
a “large skill-based export sector” at the time, since the Austro-Hungarian Empire as
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a whole was not export-oriented.101 Slovenia did inherit important industry and craft
traditions from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and with 20 percent of its population
employed in industry and crafts, it was the most industrialized Yugoslav region at the
founding of the Yugoslav kingdom. However, the bulk of Slovenian industrialization
occurred only after World War II in the communist period.
Moreover, if the existence of crucial precursors—such as guild traditions, employer
coordination, and specific union formations—were essential to explaining the subsequent development of coordinated capitalism, one would predict that the Czech Republic,
rather than Slovenia, would stand out among the countries of east central Europe.
Bohemia was one of the most industrialized regions in the Austro-Hungarian empire;
its exports were world renowned, and its craft and guild traditions ran quite deep.
Furthermore, in the interwar period, Czechoslovakia developed a successful proportional representation electoral system, and the country was the only democracy in the
region to survive until World War II. The Czech lands also had strong levels of unionization and a thriving Social Democratic Party.102
Yet Slovenia stands out from the Czech Republic, as well as from every other postcommunist country in east central Europe. This leads us to posit that while Iversen and
his collaborators may have discovered some important preconditions for the subsequent development of coordinated institutions, the intervening history of the communist
period is essential in explaining the different trajectories in east central Europe.103
Although it is not entirely surprising that Soviet communism effectively crushed the
economic interests that might have led to coordination in the Czech and Hungarian
cases, it is surprising that Yugoslav communism in effect nurtured those interests, or
at least allowed them to survive and eventually thrive in the postcommunist period.
What was it that so distinguished Yugoslav from Soviet communism? Events at
crucial historical junctures—the way communism came to power and the development
of “self-management”—led to important institutional arrangements, including workers’
councils, a decentralized and marketized economy, and shifting alliances among
workers, managers, and political elites.104 All of this allowed for the development of a
powerful labor movement, but one where the timing of its mobilization and the content
of its demands were also crucial. The contrast with Poland, where the workers’ movement also had considerable power resources yet was riven by political divisions and
a very different interpretation of interests, is revealing. So are comparisons with the
former Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Serbia, where unionization rates and worker
militancy remain high.105 Yet unlike in Slovenia, such mobilizations occurred after
nationalist wars, and well after the basic institutions of postcommunism were forged.
To the extent that it tells us something about the varieties of capitalism, the Slovenian
case—and its dramatic distinction from every other postcommunist society—suggests
a considerable unevenness to such varieties. The near-absence of coordination among
postcommunist cases underscores what others have argued about the rise of coordinated
institutions elsewhere: in contrast to liberal economies, the development of coordinated market economies appears to be particularly historically contingent and difficult
to construct.106 Although varieties of capitalism do exist, some varieties are harder to
create, and arguably harder to maintain, than others.
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Indeed, even with its particular confluence of factors, the survival of Slovenia’s
distinctive model of postcommunist coordination is not guaranteed. If Slovenia’s corporatism is, in fact, eroding under the pressures of Europeanization and globalization,
there would seem to be three possible interpretations. First, Slovenia might not be a
coordinated economy after all; however, this would beg the question of how an economy can have all the attributes of an ideal type without actually being one. Second, one
might argue that two decades is not enough time for such institutions to become consolidated. Or third, more troubling for the VoC perspective, the theory might overstate
the resilience of coordinated economies in the face of global economic pressures for
liberalization, since such pressures can create change that is both gradual and transformative.107 Time will tell which interpretation proves most lasting.
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